Abstract-This paper addresses the solution of large zerosum matrix games using randomized methods. We provide a procedure by which a player can compute mixed policies that, with high probability, are security policies against an adversary that is also using randomized methods to solve the game. The computational savings result from solving subgames that are much smaller than the original game and we provide bounds on how large these subgames should be to guarantee the desired high probability. We propose two methodologies to solve this problem. The first provides a game-independent bound on the size of the subgames that can be computed a-priori. The second procedure is useful when computation limitations prevent a player from satisfying the first a-priori bound and provides a high-probability a-posteriori bound on how much the outcome of the game can violate the precomputed security level. All our probabilistic bounds are independent of the size of the original game and could, in fact, apply to games with continuous action spaces. To demonstrate the usefulness of these results, we apply them to solve a hide-and-seek game that exhibits exponential complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
While a large number of robust design problems can be formulated as zero-sum matrix games, in practice, such games lead to extremely large -often infinite -matrices. This case arises in combinatorial problems, where decision makers are faced with a number of options that grow exponentially with the size of the problem; for example, in path planning problems where the number of paths increases combinatorially with the number of points to visit [1] . Large zero-sum matrix games also arise in partial information feedback games wherein optimal strategies are functions of the players' past actions and observations and thus, in particular, the number of strategies grow exponentially with the size of the players' action spaces.
Inspired by the use of randomized approaches to solve optimization problems, we consider an approach to solve very large zero-sum matrix games by using randomized sampling. Each player reduces her search space by taking a random sample of the available actions to construct a much smaller version of the original game. Players then solve these smaller games and utilize the saddle-point policies so obtained against each other. We call this procedure the sampled saddle-point (SSP) algorithm. Since each player only considers a small submatrix of the original game and the two players typically consider very different submatrices, the saddle-point policies obtained by this process will generally not be security policies for the whole game. This means that each player may obtain an outcome that is strictly worse than the value computed based on her submatrix. However, we show that this happens with low probability if the size of the submatrix is sufficiently large.
In this framework, a reasonable notion of security policy for a player is that the outcome of the game should not be too worse than what the player expects based on the computation of the value of her submatrix. In this paper, we analyze the SSP algorithm for zero-sum games and provide conditions under which it leads to a security policy with high probability.
Related Work
Two-player zero-sum matrix games have been studied extensively over the past decades [2] . The classical MiniMax theorem guarantees the existence of an optimal pair of strategies for the two players, each of which is a security policy for the corresponding player. However, when the matrix is of large size, the computation of the optimal strategies involves solving optimization problems with a large number of variables and constraints.
Randomized methods have been successful in providing efficient solutions to complex control design problems with probabilistic guarantees. [3] adopts a probabilistic approach to show the existence of randomized algorithms with polynomial complexity to solve complex robust stability analysis problems. [4] proposes a randomized method for a probabilistic analysis of the worst-case controller performance, and determines bounds on the sample size. [5] , [6] demonstrate the use of randomized algorithms to solve control design problems and a number of well known complex problems in matrix theory through a statistical learning approach. In [7] , [8] , [9] , the authors introduce the scenario approach to solve convex optimization problems with an infinite number of constraints, and discuss possible applications of the approach to systems and control. The results in these papers are instrumental to establish several of the results in the present paper.
Contributions
Our contributions are three-fold. Using results from the scenario approach, we show that when the sizes of the subgames solved by each player are sufficiently large, the SSP algorithm provides security policies for both players with some pre-specified high probability 1 − δ. The bounds 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control December 15-17, 2010 Hilton Atlanta Hotel, Atlanta, GA, USA on the sizes of the subgames are game independent and are easily computable a-priori. Not surprisingly, they grow with the desired confidence level 1 − δ. However, they are independent of the size of the original matrix game, which could be even infinite and not even have a value.
We also propose a procedure that provides an a-posteriori, high-probability bound on the deviation of the outcome of the game from the pre-computed security level. In particular, regardless of the size of the subgames solved by each player, we provide a high-probability bound on how much a player can expect the outcome of the game to violate the value computed based on the submatrix used to determine her saddle-point equilibrium. This bound is computed after a player selects and solves her subgame.
Third and finally, we apply our procedure to efficiently solve a hide-and-seek game, in which one player hides a treasure in one of N points and the other player searches for the treasure by visiting each of the points. This is formalized as a zero-sum game in which the player that hides the treasure wants to maximize the distance that the other player needs to travel until the treasure is found. To determine the optimal strategy for this game, it is required to solve a matrix game whose size is N × N !. Thus, exact solutions to this problem require computation that scales exponentially with the number of points N . Our approach is independent of the size of the game and therefore the total number of points plays no role in the amount of computation required. This is possible because each player concentrates on a subset of her action set, and probabilistic guarantees rather than deterministic guarantees on the quality of the solution are provided.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. The problem formulation and the SSP algorithm are described in Section II. The a-priori bounds are established in Section III. The aposteriori bounds are established in Section IV. The hideand-seek problem and the implementation of our procedure are described in Section V.
II. SAMPLED SADDLE-POINT ALGORITHM Consider a zero-sum matrix game defined by an M × N matrix A, in which player P 1 is the minimizer and selects rows and player P 2 is the maximizer and selects columns. We are interested in problems for which the matrix A is too large to permit the computation of mixed saddle-points and therefore the players are forced to consider only submatrices of A to select their policies. This scenario motivates the following sampled saddle-point (SSP) algorithm.
1) Each player P k , k ∈ {1, 2} randomly selects m k rows and n k columns of A, which uses to construct a m k × n k submatrix A k of A. Denoting by B k×ℓ the set of k× ℓ left-stochastic (0, 1)-matrices (i.e., matrices whose entries belong to the set {0, 1} and whose columns add up to one), we can express the process of constructing each submatrix A k by randomly selecting two random matrices Γ k ∈ B M ×m k and Π k ∈ B N ×n k and then computing the product:
2) Each player P k , k ∈ {1, 2} computes the mixed security value and the corresponding security policy for her submatrix A k :
where S m k and S n k denote the probability simplexes of appropriate dimensions. We callV (A 1 ) and V (A 2 ) the sampled security values of the game for players P 1 and P 2 , respectively. 3) Player P 1 selects a row according to the distribution y * 1 , whereas P 2 selects a column according to the distribution z * 2 , which correspond to the following policies for the original game
and the following game outcome
We call y * and z * the sampled security policies for players P 1 and P 2 , respectively. We say that the SSP algorithm is ǫ-secure for player P 1 with confidence 1 − δ if
Here and in the sequel, we use a subscript in the probability measure P to emphasize which random variables define the events that is being measured. In essence, condition (1) states that the probability that the outcome of the game will violate P 1 's sampled security value by more than ǫ is smaller than δ. Similarly, we say that the SSP algorithm is ǫ-secure for player P 2 with confidence 1 − δ if
The previous definitions guarantee that the two players will be surprised with (low) probability δ when playing with policies obtained from a one-shot solution to the SSP algorithm. However, no specific guarantee is given to the inherent safety of the policies/values obtained using this algorithm. So, e.g., player P 1 computes y * once using the SSP algorithm and then plays this policy multiple times against a sequence of policies z * that P 2 obtained by running the SSP algorithm multiple times, P 1 could conceivably be surprised with high probability. This would happen if she was "unlucky" and got a particular (low probability) y * that is particularly bad or a valueV (A 1 ) that is particularly optimistic. To avoid this scenario, we introduce notions of security that refer to specific policies/values: We say that the policy y * with valuē V (A 1 ) is ǫ-secure for player P 1 with confidence 1 − δ if
and that the policy z * with value V (A 2 ) is ǫ-secure for player P 2 with confidence 1 − δ if
So far, we have not specified the joint distribution of the row/column extraction matrices Γ 1 , Γ 2 , Π 1 , Π 2 , but this distribution will clearly affect the outcomes of the algorithm. In the context of noncooperative games, one should presume the extractions of the two players to be independent of each other, as stated in the following assumption:
Assumption II.1 (Independence) The four random matrices Γ 1 , Π 1 , Γ 2 , Π 2 are statistically independent, with the columns being independent and identically distributed within each matrix.
Remark II.1 (Non-matrix games)
The results in this paper do not depend on the fact that the original game is a matrix game. They would extend trivially to any cost-function J(u, d), u ∈ U , d ∈ D where U and D denote the sets of policies for the minimizer and maximizer, respectively. In fact, it is not even necessary that the original game has saddle-point policies since all that the SSP algorithm uses is the fact that when we take finite samples of the sets of policies, we obtain finite matrix games.
Remark II.2 (Non-unique security policies)
When the matrices A 1 and A 2 have multiple security policies, the SSP algorithm does not specify which of these should be used to define the sampled security policies. However, the choice of security policy may have a significant effect on the value of the probabilities in (1) and (2) . In view of this, any useful probabilistic guarantee for ǫ-security should hold independently of which security policy is used in the SSP algorithm. This is the case of all results in this paper.
III. A-PRIORI PROBABILISTIC GUARANTEES
The main result of this section provides an a-priori bound on the size of the submatrices for the players that guarantees ǫ-security with ǫ = 0. 
for somen 2 ≥ n 2 , then the SSP algorithm is ǫ = 0-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ. If one further increases n 1 to satisfy
for some β > 0, then, with probability 1 higher than 1 − β, the policy y * with valueV (A 1 ) is ǫ = 0-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ.
2) If Γ 1 and Γ 2 have identically distributed columns and
for somem 1 ≥ m 1 , then the SSP algorithm is ǫ = 0-secure for P 2 with confidence 1 − δ. If one further increases m 2 to satisfy
for some β > 0, then, with probability 2 higher than 1 − β, the policy z * with value V (A 2 ) is ǫ = 0-secure for P 2 with confidence 1 − δ.
In words, this results states that it is always possible to guarantee ǫ = 0-security for P 1 , provided that she constructs her submatrix A 1 utilizing a sufficiently large number of columns. In particular, she always needs to choose a number of columns n 1 larger than the number of columns n 2 that P 2 is considering for her mixed policies. The additional number of columns P 1 needs to consider is a function of the number m 1 of rows that P 1 wants to consider for her mixed policy and the desired confidence levels. The result for P 2 is analogous.
In the probabilistic guarantees provided by Theorem III.1 with (5), the confidence 1 − δ refers to the extraction of all the row/column matrices Γ 1 , Γ 2 , Π 1 , Π 2 as in (1). However, for the probabilistic guarantees with (6), the confidence 1 − δ refers to the extraction of Γ 2 , Π 2 as in (3), whereas the confidence 1 − β refers solely to the extraction of the matrix Π 1 and holds for any given matrix Γ 1 (as shown in the proof).
Note that only the logarithm of the confidence level β appears in bounds regarding the security of y * and z * . One can therefore make β extremely small with a relatively small additional computational cost.
Remark III.2 (P 1 's knowledge of n 2 ) According to Theorem III.1, for player P 1 to enjoy guaranteed ǫ = 0-security with confidence 1 − δ, she must know an upper boundn 2 on the number of columns that P 2 is using to construct her submatrix A 2 . Even if P 1 does not known 2 precisely and, e.g., underestimatesn 2 by a certain percentage, then (5) and (6) are still useful since they predict that the performance degradation in the confidence level δ should grow roughly by the same percentage. This is because the bounds in (5) and (6) essentially scale withn 2 /δ. An analogous comment could be made regarding the bounds (7) and (8) and about P 2 's knowledge of m 1 .
Remark III.3 (P 1 's knowledge of the distribution of Π 2 )
To apply Theorem III.1, the distributions of Π 1 and Π 2 must match, which means that P 1 must sample the columns of the matrix A using the same distribution as P 2 . However, it is possible to extend all the bounds presented in this paper to the case when there is a mismatch between the distributions of P 1 and P 2 (cf. [ 
10, Section 4]).
Proof of Theorem III.1: We only prove the statement 1, since the proof of statement 2 can be obtained by symmetry. By definition of the security valueV (A 1 ), we have that
The confidence level β for P 2 refers solely to the extraction of the matrix Γ 2 and holds for any given matrix Π 2 .
= min
where e j (n) denotes the jth element of the canonical basis of R n , θ := (y, v), and Θ := S m1 × R. Since n 1 is an integer multiple ofn 2 , i.e., n 1 = Kn 2 with K = m1+1 δ − 1 , we can take the Kn 2 columns of Π 1 ∈ B N ×Kn2 to construct K i.i.d. matrices ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . . , ∆ K , each in the set B N ×n2 . If we then define the function f (θ, ∆) = max j∈{1,...,n2}
, we can rewrite (9) as
Let the minimum above be achieved for some θ * = (y * 1 ,V (A 1 )). For any given realization of the matrix Γ 1 (which is independent of the ∆ i by Assumption II.1) we conclude from [8, Proposition 3] that the (conditional) probability that another matrix ∆ sampled independently from the same distribution as the ∆ i satisfies the constraint f (θ * , ∆) ≤ 0 can be lower-bounded as follows:
where the second inequality is a consequence of (5) . Using the definition of f and θ * , we can re-write (10) as
Since n 2 ≤n 2 , we further conclude that
Under Assumption II.1, when the columns of Π 1 and Π 2 are identically distributed, the matrix consisting of the first n 2 columns of ∆ can be viewed as the matrix Π 2 and we conclude from the inequality above that
we conclude that
Since we have shown that this bound holds for an arbitrary realization of Γ 1 , it also holds for the unconditional probability, which shows that the SSP algorithm is ǫ = 0-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ.
If instead of applying [8, Proposition 3] we apply [9, Theorem 1] and using (6), we conclude that
with probability higher than 1 − β, where the confidence level 1 − β refers to the extraction of
The proof now proceeds exactly as before, but with (10) replaced by the inequality above that now involves a probability conditioned to y * andV (A 1 ). Thus, with probability higher than 1 − β, the policy y * with valuē V (A 1 ) is ǫ = 0-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ.
IV. A-POSTERIORI PROBABILISTIC GUARANTEES
Suppose that, due to computational limitations, player P 1 cannot satisfy the bounds in Theorem III.1 to obtain ǫ = 0-security for a given level of confidence 1 − δ. One option to overcome this difficulty would be to settle for a lower level of confidence until the bounds in Theorem III.1 hold for a value of n 1 that is computationally acceptable for P 1 . However, one may desire to maintain the same high level of confidence, and instead accept a violation ǫ > 0 of the sampled security value. In this section, we explore this option, which is not covered by Theorem III.1. For brevity, we present the SSP algorithm from the perspective of P 1 .
Consider the following procedure for P 1 : 1) Pick a value for m 1 , n 1 and use the SSP algorithm to compute a sampled security policy y * and the corresponding sampled security valueV (A 1 ). 
where e j denotes the jth element of the canonical basis of R k1 .
The following result provides an a-posteriori guarantee on the quality of the so-obtained solution. 
for somen 2 ≥ n 2 , then the SSP algorithm is ǫ-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ for any
If, for some β > 0, one further increases k 1 to satisfy
then, with probability higher than 1 − β, the policy y * with valueV (A 1 ) is ǫ-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ.
In the probabilistic guarantee provided by Theorem IV.1 with (12), the confidence 1 − δ refers not only to the extraction of the row/column matrices Γ 1 , Γ 2 , Π 1 , Π 2 , but also to the test matrixΠ 1 since ǫ depends on it, i.e., (1) should be understood as
For the probabilistic guarantee with (14), the confidence 1 − δ refers to the extraction of Γ 2 , Π 2 , i.e., (3) should be understood as
whereas the confidence 1 − β refers solely to the extraction of the matrixΠ 1 .
Proof of Theorem IV.1: From the definition ofv and (13), we conclude that
where
we can rewrite (16) as
For any given realizations of y * andV (A 1 ) (which are independent of the ∆ i ), we conclude from [8, Proposition 4] that the (conditional) probability that another matrix ∆, sampled independently from the same distribution as the ∆ i , satisfies the constraint f (∆) ≤ max i∈{1,...,K} f (∆ i ) can be lower-bounded as follows:
where the second inequality is a consequence of (12). Using the definition of f and (17), we conclude from (18) that
and therefore
Given that
we get that
Since we have shown that this bound holds for arbitrary realizations of y * andV (A 1 ), it also holds for the unconditional probability, from which (15) follows.
If instead of applying [8, Proposition 4] we use (14) and apply [11, Theorem 1], we conclude that
with probability higher than 1−β, where the confidence level 1 − β refers to the extraction ofΠ 1 = [∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ K ] that defines ǫ. The proof can now proceed exactly as before, but with (18) replaced by the inequality above that now involves a probability conditioned to y * ,V (A 1 ), and ǫ. This shows that, with probability higher than 1 − β, the policy y * with valueV (A 1 ) is ǫ-secure for P 1 with confidence 1 − δ.
V. HIDE-AND-SEEK MATRIX GAME
Consider a zero-sum game where P 1 hides a non-moving object (treasure) in one of N points {p 1 , . . . , p N } ⊂ R 2 on the plane and P 2 has to find the treasure with minimum cost, by traveling from point to point until she finds it. The game is played over the set of mixed policies:
• P 1 chooses a probability distribution z ∈ S N for the treasure over the N points, and • P 2 chooses a probability distribution y ∈ S M over the set R := {r j : j = 1, . . . , M } of M := N ! routes that start at P 2 's initial position p 0 ∈ R 2 and go through all possible permutations of the points. Each route is assigned a cost equal to its Euclidean length:
where r j (0) := p 0 and each subsequent r j (k) ∈ R 2 , k ∈ {1, . . . , N } denotes the kth point in route r j . When P 1 chooses to hide the treasure at point i and P 2 selects route r j , the outcome of the game is equal to the cost of route r j from its initial point until the point p i where the treasure lies. Namely,
where the summation ends at the index k * ij for which r j (k * ij ) corresponds to the point i where the treasure is hidden. The minus sign in (19) is needed to maintain consistency with the formulation in the first part of the paper, where P 1 is the minimizer. Indeed, P 1 hides the treasure to maximize the distance and therefore to minimize the entries of A.
The exact computation of the optimal mixed strategies is intractable because the size of the matrix A is N ×N !. However, the results in this paper regarding the SSP algorithm have a computational complexity that is independent of the size of the game, i.e., we can provide probabilistic guarantees for games with an arbitrarily large number of points.
In this game, only the player P 2 that chooses paths has a huge number of options (M = N !) so we can assume that both players consider all possible N locations where P 1 can hide the treasure (all rows of A), but randomly select only a small number of paths (columns of A) to construct their submatrices. This means that the player P 2 that selects the paths will never be surprised since she always considers all options for the actions of P 1 . However, the player P 1 that hides the treasure should respect the bounds provided by Theorems III.1 and IV.1 to avoid unpleasant surprises.
In our numerical experiments, we considered N = 10 points distributed uniformly randomly in a square region of side length equal to 50 units. For a fixed value ofn 2 , β, and δ, we ran the a-posteriori procedure multiple times (described in Section IV) using the bound in (14), and studied the outcomev in (11) for increasing values of n 1 up to the corresponding a-priori bound (6), indicated by an arrow in Figure 1 . Sincev is obtained through a randomized procedure, it is a random variable and takes different values in the different Monte Carlo runs. Figure 1 shows the dotdashed 90 (resp. dashed 50) percentile curve such that 90% (resp. 50%) of the realizations ofv were below this curve. We then repeated the experiments using the a-posteriori bound in (12), and studied the outcomev in (11) for increasing values of n 1 up to the corresponding a-priori bound (5). The solid 90 (resp. thin dashed 50) percentile curves are plotted in Figure 1 .
We observe that all of these curves are reasonably "flat", implying that with the choice of n 1 that is a few orders of magnitude lower than the a-priori bound, one can obtain a security strategy with a relatively small increase in the aposteriori security levelv. For example, from Figure 1 , we conclude that with a value of n 1 upto 40 times lower than the a-priori bound (6) needed for ǫ = 0-security of the policy y * , in 90% (resp. 50%) of the simulations, the increase in the a-posteriori security levelv for the strategy y * is at most 5 (resp. 3) units. In conclusion, with a small increase in the a-posteriori security level, a player needs to sample much fewer columns than the corresponding a-priori bound.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We addressed the solution of large zero-sum matrix games using randomized techniques. We provided a procedure by which each player samples a submatrix, computes mixed policies for the submatrix and uses the resulting strategy to play against the other player. We proposed the notion of security policies and levels for each player, and derived a-priori game-independent bounds on the size of the submatrices that guarantees a security policy with high probability. We also presented an a-posteriori bound on how much the outcome of the game can violate the precomputed security level if the size of the submatrices do not satisfy the a-priori bounds. Finally, we applied the technique to solve a combinatorial hide-and-seek game.
This work suggests a lot of interesting future directions. Incremental methods to reduce the bound on the submatrices and extensions of the sampling approach to partial information feedback games appear promising. It would also be interesting to analyze closed-loop versions of the hide-andseek game that involve the player seeking the treasure taking measurements of the treasure location.
